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Abstract 
Recent movements in oil prices on international markets have generated many comments on the role that oil prices 
may play for Central Banks of oil-importing countries, oil price shocks being interpreted as supply shocks leading to 
higher inflation rates and lower economic growth. In this paper, we examine the role played by oil prices in the 
monetary policy strategy of 4 major Central Banks: the U.S. Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of Canada and the 
Bank of England. Using an Ordered Probit model, we assess the reaction of each Central Bank to oil price changes 
and investigate a potential asymmetric response to oil price increases and decreases. Our results suggest that the role of 
oil price for Central Bankers may be very different depending on the objectives and the strategy of each Central Bank 
regarding inflation and output stabilization.
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     1 Introduction
Recent movements in oil prices on international markets have generated many comments on
the role that oil prices may play for Central Banks of oil-importing countries. The dollar price
of oil indeed rose sharply between 1999 and 2007, going from $12.5/barrel in January 1999 to
$145/barrel in July 2008, before falling dramatically during the second half of 2008 to the $30-
$50/barrel range1. This new and long-lasting oil shock received important consideration for its
presumed effect on macroeconomic variables: an oil shock is expected to generate inﬂation,
since oil prices are included in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and increase production costs.
Inﬂationary pressures in turn reduce margins and the purchasing power of consumers, leading to
a lower economic growth. Many empirical papers indeed suggest that the big oil price shocks of
the 1970s strongly affected output and inﬂation (Hamilton, 1983). However, recent researches
suggest that oil shocks have had much smaller macroeconomic effects since the early 1980s
(Hooker, 1996, 2002; LeBlanc and Chinn, 2004).
Severalpapersclaimthatthisbreakdownintherelationshipbetweenoilandmacroeconomic
indicators is partly related to a change in monetary policy (Blanchard and Galí, 2007). To some
extent, monetary policy can indeed inﬂuence the impact of an oil shock on the inﬂation rate
and GDP growth. On the one hand, inﬂationary pressures may lead the Central Bank to raise
its short-term interest rate following an increase in oil prices, with the risk of amplifying the
economic slowdown. On the other hand, monetary authorities may choose to cut their interest
rate to prevent a recession after an oil shock, with the risk of letting inﬂationary pressures in-
crease. The solution of this trade-off between inﬂation and output stabilization would therefore
depend on the preferences of policymakers: preserving price stability or maintaining output and
employment near their potential level.
Bernanke et al. (1997) investigate the inﬂuence of the systematic reaction of the Fed mone-
tary policy in the U.S. economy (using a VAR modelling) and conclude that the upward move-
ments of the Fed Funds rates explain to a large extent the low economic growth observed after
oil shocks. They claim that a counter-inﬂation monetary policy is systematically harmful, and
that a "neutral monetary policy" could avert the contractionary response to oil shocks2. Hamil-
ton and Herrera (2004) refute the conclusions of Bernanke et al. (1997) and alleviate the re-
sponsibility of monetary policy in the transmission of oil shocks to activity. According to them,
the direct impact of rising oil prices on output is underestimated because of a bad speciﬁcation
of the model and a misleading perception of the monetary policy driven by the Federal Reserve.
However, Leduc and Sill (2004) demonstrate, in a calibrated general equilibrium model, that
monetary policy may contribute to nearly 40 percent to the drop in output following a rise in oil
prices. The Central Bank can not fully insulate real output from an oil price shock, and the real
effects thus vary depending on the priority assigned by the monetary authority.
The asymmetry of the relationship between oil prices and macroeconomic indicators is also
examined as a speciﬁc feature in the literature. Mork (1989), Mory (1993) and Mork et al.
(1994) ﬁnd that the relationship between oil prices and activity is nonlinear since an increase in
energy prices diminishes the output to a larger extent than falling prices improve the economic
situation. This asymmetry can be justiﬁed by many reasons developed by Huntington (1998)
and Balke et al. (2002). One of them is that Central Banks potentially adjust their monetary
1Those ﬁgures relate to WTI (West Texas Intermediate) oil prices.
2The issue of "neutral monetary policies" is discussed in Brown and Yücel (1999).
2policy when oil prices increase, whereas interest rates are unchanged when prices fall (see
Leduc and Sill, 2004). Asymmetric preferences of the authorities and/or the expectation of
a nonlinear transmission from crude oil prices to output and overall inﬂation may explain an
asymmetric response from Central Banks.
Our goal is to examine the role played by oil prices in the monetary policy strategy of 4
major Central Banks: the U.S. Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of Canada and the Bank
of England. A comparison of the practices of those Central Banks regarding oil prices seem
to be very appealing, since they have different objectives and display different monetary policy
strategies. Even if each of them is concerned with ﬁghting inﬂation, the U.S. authorities also
seek to maintain employment near the full employment level. The main objective of the others
is price stability. The Bank of Canada and the Bank of England even adopted an inﬂation
targeting regime3, while the ECB does not have a true inﬂation target but a primary objective of
containing the inﬂation rate "below but close to 2%". Differences in the objectives, strategies
and inﬂation rate targets of those 4 major Central Banks are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Monetary policy frameworks
Objective(s) Strategy Inﬂation "target"
U.S. Federal Reserve Twofold objective : stable prices Mixed policy ("ﬁne No explicit inﬂation
(Fed) and maximum employment tuning") target
European Central Bank Main objective : price stability A "two-pillar strategy" : Below, but close, to 2% -
(ECB) economic analysis CPI inﬂation
+ monetary analysis
Bank of Canada Single objective : low inﬂation Inﬂation targeting 2% (midpoint of the target
range 1-3%) - CPI inﬂation
Bank of England Single objective : low inﬂation Inﬂation targeting 3% (within the range 2-4%) -
CPI inﬂation
Inthis paper, weassess thereactionof each Central Bank to oil price changes and investigate
a potential asymmetric response to oil price increases and decreases. We assess these two
questions by estimating a reaction function based on a Taylor rule extended with oil prices,
using an Ordered Probit model, as in Gerlach (2007).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the methodology
while the results are developed in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes and provides some
insights.
3Inﬂation targeting is a monetary policy regime in which a Central Bank attempts to keep inﬂation in a declared
target range, usually using the short-term interest rate as the instrument. Inﬂation targeting was pioneered in New
Zealand in 1990, and then introduced by the Bank of Canada in 1991 and by the Bank of England in 1997.
32 Methodology
The speciﬁcation of our model follows the works of Gerlach (2007). We assume that the
Central Bank proceeds to a gradual adjustment of the actual interest rate, as in Judd and Rude-
busch (1998):
i∗
t −it = γ1it−1+γ2∆it−1+γ3(πt −π∗)+γ4yt +γ5∆ot +εt (1)
where it is the actual short-term nominal interest rate, i∗
t the desired interest rate, πt the inﬂation
rate and yt the output gap. π∗ is the target for the inﬂation rate, which is supposed constant
over time. ∆ot is the 12-month annualized change rate of oil prices expressed in domestic
currency. We also distinguish between positive (∆o+
t ) and negative (∆o−
t ) oil price growth rates
to investigate a potential asymmetric behaviour.
The decision of the Central Bank is therefore deﬁned as a choice among three possibilities:




∆it = −1 if i∗
t −it−1 ≤ µ1
∆it = 0 if µ1 < i∗
t −it−1 ≤ µ2




t would be the optimal interest rate if it could be set on a continuous scale. This is the
latent (unobserved) variable of our model. The effective change in the observed interest rate
depends on where the latent variable is relative to threshold values µ1 and µ2.
We work on monthly data. Interest rates are extracted from the IMF International Finan-
cial Statistics (IFS) database. The monetary instrument is represented by the Federal Funds
rate for the U.S., the Marginal Reﬁnancing Operations (MRO) rate for the ECB, the overnight
rate for the Bank of Canada, and the Bank Rate for the Bank of England. For oil prices, we
use spot prices of WTI (West Texas Intermediate) from the EIA (Energy Information Admin-
istration) database5. Oil prices are expressed in domestic currency using a bilateral exchange
rate (National currency units per U.S. dollar). The inﬂation rate is the 12-month growth rate
of the CPI. The output gap is constructed using the Industrial Production Index (IPI) adjusted
for seasonal variations, and deﬁned as the monthly deviation of the IPI from a trend calculated
using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter set to 14400 (standard value for
monthly data). We also explore the robustness of our results using an alternative measure of
activity: the unemployment gap, also calculated as the monthly deviation of the unemployment
rate (adjusted for seasonal variations) from a trend obtained with the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. All
the series (except interest rates and oil prices) are extracted from the OECD Main Economic
Indicators.
We use an Ordered Probit model to estimate this discrete choice model. Since the seminal
paper from Eichengreen et al. (1985), the estimation of monetary policy reaction function by
4We do not discriminate interest rates changes regarding the scope of these changes. The size of our sample
entails very few observations of 50-basis-point increases or decreases. That’s why we match them with 25-basis-
point variations.
5The Brent price would perhaps have been more appropriate for the Euro Area and the United-Kingdom, but
this price is also highly correlated with the WTI (with a correlation coefﬁcient of 0.998 between the two prices).
4means of Ordered Probit models has become increasingly popular. Examples of their diffusion
include Galí et al. (2004), Carstensen (2006) and Gerlach (2007). Since the levels of the esti-
mated coefﬁcients can not be directly interpreted, we also analyse the marginal effects relative
to oil prices coefﬁcients6.
3 The results
The sample of our estimates goes from 1999:1 to the end of 20077. We decide to begin the
sample in 1999 in order to describe the true ECB policy and compare it with the practice of the
other Central Banks. Table 2 reports the results of our estimates of Equation (1) including the
standard oil price indicator.
Oil prices play an important role in the monetary policy decisions, except for the Bank of
England which seems rather insensitive oil price changes. Interestingly, the reaction of the U.S.
Fed to a change in oil prices is very different from those of the ECB and the Bank of Canada. On
the one hand, rising oil prices increase the probability of a reduction of the Fed’s key interest
rate. This conclusion is consistent with the results from Hess (2000) that during Chairman
Greenspan’s tenure the Fed has acted to make monetary policy looser in response to an oil price
increase8. It may reﬂects the U.S. speciﬁc concern for output stabilization, conducting the Fed
to act in order to ﬁght output contractions and unemployment rises. On the other hand, the
ECB and the Bank of Canada react to oil price increases by leading a tighter monetary policy.
They thus seem to fear inﬂationary pressures associated to rising oil prices rather than a possible
downturn of the economy. This result is in line with their main objective of price stability. The
adoption of a true inﬂation targeting regime does not seem to make a major difference, since
the ECB doesn’t have a true inﬂation target. The results reached using an unemployment gap
(instead of the benchmark output gap), reported in Appendix A, are rather in line with our key
conclusions. The only difference is that the Bank of England also react to oil prices (in the same
way as the ECB and the Bank of Canada) in this speciﬁcation. However, this result is not very
robust.
The next step in our analysis deals with the potential asymmetric reaction of policymakers
regarding oil prices. Table 3 report the results reached when distinguishing between oil price in-
creases and decreases. Those regressions corroborate the previous results: the Bank of England
does not seem to react to oil price increases nor decreases, the U.S. Fed seems to prefer a looser
monetary policy when oil prices increase, while the ECB and the Bank of Canada have higher
probabilities to increase their interest rates after an oil shock. Very interestingly, the Fed does
not demonstrate any asymmetric response and also adjust its key interest rate when oil prices
decrease (by tightening its monetary policy). On the contrary, the ECB and the Bank of Canada
only adjust their interest rates when oil prices increase. It suggests that they fear inﬂationary
pressures associated to an oil shock, but not the risk of a deﬂation or a strong disinﬂation when
energy prices decrease. Two potential explanations may be put forward such a behaviour. The
6The marginal effects are the change in the probability of each modality (-1, 0 and +1, i.e. respectively decrease,
no change and increase in the MRO rate) for a one-unit change (a one-percentage-point change in our case) in the
explanatory variable (calculated for mean values of explanatory variables). The computation of marginal effects
thus allows us to interpret and compare the impact of small changes of each variable on the Central Bank decision.
72007:7 for Canada, 2007:8 for the U.K., 2007:9 for the euro area and 2007:10 for the U.S.
8Hess (2000) shows that during the 1970s, prior to Paul Volcker’s chairmanship, the Fed used to have the
opposite reaction and tightened monetary policy in response to an oil price increase.
5ﬁrst one is related to asymmetric preferences of the ECB and the Bank of Canada, while the
second one is related to their expectations that some downward price rigidities would stop a
downward adjustment from crude oil prices to CPI inﬂation. All in all, such an asymmetric
reaction of the ECB and the Bank of Canada may be involved in the asymmetric relationship
between crude oil prices and output found by Mork (1989).
Finally, to assess the magnitude of the Central Banks reaction to oil price changes, we report
inTables4and5themarginaleffectsofoilpricechangesontheprobabilitiesofmonetarypolicy
changes, i.e a decrease (−1) and an increase (+1) of interest rates9. Those marginal effects
suggest that a ten-percentage-point increase in crude oil prices rises the probability that the Fed
cut its interest rates by 0.021 and decreases the probability of a tighter monetary policy in the
U.S. by 0.03. For both the Bank of Canada and the ECB, we observe the opposite behaviour: a
ten-percentage-point increase in crude oil prices decreases the probability of lower interest rates
by 0.020 and 0.013 respectively, while increasing the probability of a tighter monetary policy
by 0.023 and 0.027 respectively. Moreover, oil price decreases only affect the behaviour of the
Fed, whereas they have no effect on the probability of adjusting interest rates for the ECB and
the Bank of Canada10.
Table 2: Ordered Probit estimates with oil price changesa
U.S. CANADA U.K. EURO AREA
it−1 0.0794 -0.3141 -0.4464 -0.3275
(0.0827) (0.1170)*** (0.1742)** (0.1866)*
∆it−1 3.0270 2.4375 -1.8080 0.2660
(0.5400)*** (0.8162)*** (0.4219)*** (0.8954)
πt −π∗ 0.2529 -0.0121 0.7520 -0.518491
(0.1849) (0.1643) (0.2809)*** (0.3555)
yt -0.0355 0.1103 0.5275 0.5055
(0.1328) (0.0895) (0.1910)*** (0.1778)***
∆ot -0.0138 0.0112 0.0098 0.0084
(0.0048)*** (0.005)*** (0.0061) (0.0048)*
Number of observations 106 103 104 103
Pseudo R2b 0.2419 0.1954 0.2375 0.1420
log(L) -80.5901 -73.6624 -72.1770 -59.6783
a Standard errors are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% respectively.
b The pseudo-R2 is the Mac Fadden R2. It is calculated as 1−log(L)/log(L0) where
log(L0) is the log-likelihood of a model computed with only a constant term.
9We should note that oil prices do not have a signiﬁcant effect in the more frequent decision: the status quo.
10Marginal effects computed on regressions using the unemployment gap instead of the output gap provide very
similar results.
6Table 3: Ordered Probit estimates with asymmetric oil pricesa
U.S. CANADA U.K. EURO AREA
it−1 0.0252 -0.3141 -0.4748 -0.4319
(0.0885) (0.1173)*** (0.1885)** (0.1990)**
∆it−1 2.9841 2.4372 -1.7828 0.2583
(0.5433)*** (0.8437)*** (0.4238)*** (0.9152)
πt −π∗ 0.2465 -0.0121 0.7628 -0.4988
(0.1864) (0.1713) (0.2816)*** (0.3598)
yt 0.0592 0.1103 0.5394 0.6021
(0.1441) (0.0910) (0.1930)*** (0.1901)***
∆o+
t -0.0112 0.0112 0.0126 0.0153
(0.0050)** (0.0053)** (0.0092) (0.0063)**
∆o−
t -0.0465 0.0112 0.0021 -0.0162
(0.0193)** (0.0214) (0.0198) (0.0149)
Number of observations 106 103 104 103
Pseudo R2b 0.2566 0.1954 0.2384 0.1637
log(L) -79.0264 -73.6624 -72.0942 -58.1691
a Standard errors are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% respectively.
b The pseudo-R2 is the Mac Fadden R2. It is calculated as 1−log(L)/log(L0) where
log(L0) is the log-likelihood of a model computed with only a constant term.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the role played by oil prices in the monetary policy strategy
of 4 major Central Banks: the U.S. Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of Canada and the
Bank of England. Using an Ordered Probit model, we assess the reaction of each Central Bank
to oil price changes and investigate a potential asymmetric response to oil price increases and
decreases. Our results yield three kinds of behaviour. On the one hand, the U.S. Fed seems to
accommodate oil price shocks by conducting a loose monetary policy when oil prices increase.
On the other hand, the ECB and the Bank of Canada display a restrictive reaction to oil price
changes in order to ﬁght inﬂationary pressures induced by oil price increases. As for the Bank
of England, it does not react at all to oil price changes. Our results thus suggest that the role
of oil prices for Central Bankers may be very different depending on the objectives and the
strategy of each Central Bank regarding inﬂation and output stabilization.
Finally, the ECB and the Bank of Canada display an asymmetric response to oil price
changes, ﬁghting inﬂationary pressures related to oil price increases, but not reacting at all
to oil price decreases. Such an asymmetric reaction may provide an additional explanation to
the asymmetric relationship between crude oil prices and output emphasized in the literature.
It does not mean that those two Central Banks create the asymmetry in the relationship, but
only contribute to it. The optimality of this asymmetric behaviour of Central Bankers will be
investigated in a upcoming paper.
7Table 4: Marginal effects of oil prices on the proba-
bility of a more accommodative policy a
U.S. CANADA U.K. EURO AREA
∆ot 0.0027 -0.0020 -0.0039 -0.0077
(0.0010)*** (0.0010)** (0.0024) (0.0005)
∆o+
t 0.0021 -0.0020 -0.0050 -0.0013
(0.0010)** (0.0010)** (0.0037) (0.0007)*
∆o−
t 0.0088 -0.002 -0.0008 0.0014
(0.0039)*** (0.0039) (0.0079) (0.0014)
a Standard errors are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁ-
cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
Table 5: Marginal effects of oil prices on the proba-
bility of a tighter policy a
U.S. CANADA U.K. EURO AREA
∆ot -0.0038 0.0023 0.0038 0.0016
(0.0013)*** (0.0011)** (0.0024) (0.0009)*
∆o+
t -0.0030 0.0023 0.0049 0.0027
(0.0014)** (0.0011)** (0.0036) (0.0012)**
∆o−
t -0.0126 0.0023 0.0008 -0.0029
(0.0054)*** (0.0043) (0.0078) (0.0027)
a Standard errors are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁ-
cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
8Appendix A. Robustness checks with the unemployment gap
Table 6: Ordered Probit estimates with oil price changesa
U.S. CANADA U.K. EURO AREA
it−1 0.0720 -0.3171 -0.3994 -0.8329
(0.0810) (0.1281)** (0.1661)** (0.2813)***
∆it−1 3.0246 2.6626 -1.4852 0.3517
(0.5424)*** (0.7904)*** (0.3617)*** (0.9137)
πt −π∗ 0.1850 -0.0237 0.4912 -0.648863
(0.2061) (0.1654) (0.2461)** (0.3673)*
ut −u∗ -0.2861 -0.5688 -1.1083 -5.4429
(0.5844) (0.7469) (0.8219) (1.5591)***
∆ot -0.0146 0.0113 0.0101 0.0201
(0.0042)** (0.0055)** (0.0055)* (0.0052)***
Number of observations 106 103 104 103
Pseudo R2b 0.2427 0.1902 0.2039 0.1761
log(L) -80.5068 -74.1383 -75.3601 -57.3097
a Standard errors are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% respectively.
b The pseudo-R2 is the Mac Fadden R2. It is calculated as 1−log(L)/log(L0) where
log(L0) is the log-likelihood of a model computed with only a constant term.
Table 7: Ordered Probit estimates with asymmetric oil pricesa
U.S. CANADA U.K. EURO AREA
it−1 0.0309 -0.3159 -0.3974 -0.8413
(0.0843) (0.1283)** (0.1777)** (0.2848)***
∆it−1 2.9851 2.6226 -1.4875 0.3445
(0.5461)*** (0.8310)*** (0.3690)*** (0.9142)
πt −π∗ 0.1923 -0.0310 0.4907 -0.6690
(0.2070) (0.1717) (0.2468)** (0.3809)*
ut −u∗ -0.4321 -0.5578 -1.1071 -5.5404
(0.5931) (0.7507) (0.8228) (1.6357)***
∆o+
t -0.0106 0.0110 0.0099 0.0194
(0.0048)** (0.0058)** (0.0087) (0.0064)***
∆o−
t -0.0446 0.0145 0.0107 0.0231
(0.0173)*** (0.0211) (0.0184) (0.0155)
Number of observations 106 103 104 103
Pseudo R2b 0.2583 0.1904 0.2039 0.1764
log(L) -78.8449 -74.1257 -75.3603 -57.2885
a Standard errors are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% respectively.
b The pseudo-R2 is the Mac Fadden R2. It is calculated as 1−log(L)/log(L0) where
log(L0) is the log-likelihood of a model computed with only a constant term.
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